The Better Angels of our Nature - On the prospects of negotiating with terrorists

Popular thought has long dictated that negotiating with terrorists is a bad idea. This was most ably illustrated by President Harrison Ford in the 1997 film Air Force One, where he explained in his decisive, gravel-voiced way that America would in no way budge on terrorist demands, which created an awful lot of headaches when his plane got hijacked by Gary Oldman. Also, President Bush, in giving his ultimatum to terrorist leaders after the events of September 11th 2001, said that it "was not open to negotiation or discussion", but we don't really need to listen to that.

That makes some sense, of course. Negotiation may legitimise terrorist groups, may suggest to other groups that they can achieve their goals through violent action, or may simply prove futile in the context of terrorist motive and behaviour. But despite their public rhetoric, governments can and have utilised negotiation and dialogue to address terrorist conflicts, and with good reason. Just as holding a flat meeting to talk through failings of dish washing and cleaning, dialogue can break a cycle of violence and retribution. It can reduce the popular support upon which many terrorist groups rely. It can help resolve the causes of conflict, thereby preventing future terrorism. Not every terrorist conflict may be resolved by these more peaceful means, of course; indeed, assuming such would be as folly as maintaining a rigid stance in which dialogue could never be exchanged with terrorists. But there are situations in which negotiation and dialogue may be used to address terrorist conflicts, and, indeed, where it may be preferable to more traditional approaches of force.

Not All Terrorists are Created Equal...

Terrorists tend to get lumped in as one big amorphous group, but look a little deeper and you'll likely find a good deal of variety. On one end, you've got groups with "apocalyptic" goals; they're unlikely to equivocate, and you might not have much luck getting them to compromise or think rationally. But others have more concrete political aspirations, and are therefore more open to talk. Those aspirations might still be unpalatable, but they're not necessarily so "out there" as to be out of the question.

More importantly, the ways in which groups regard the utility of violence says something about their suitability to negotiation. For example, the Irish Republican Army realised by the late 1980s that military action was no longer as effective as it once was, and was therefore willing to look at alternatives. In such situations, a government has to be ready to open the way for dialogue and negotiation.

Different terrorist groups also differ greatly in their organisational structure. Some, such as al Qaeda, are quite decentralised; the defeat of bin Laden not necessarily having a huge practical effect across the rest of the organisation. It makes it tricky to come to a successful outcome in negotiation, as the disparate elements of the group may be more inclined to follow their own aims, and no one negotiating partner would possess the political will to ensure agreements are adhered to. On the other hand, if you can split off the more practical elements of a terrorist group from the radical elements out to reject any thought of compromise, you might see the group's power base diluted to the point where it's no longer the threat it once was.

... Nor Are All Negotiations

The term "negotiation" tends to bring to mind images of leaders sitting around a big cabinet room table, or sitting at the UN, or those cheesy stock images of mindless businesspeople grinning inanely about their winning business deal. But negotiation takes on many forms. It may be formal or informal; performed by heads-of-state, government officials, non-governmental organisations, religious groups, or private citizens. In situations where it might not be appropriate to have a government be seen to talk with a terrorist group, lest the group be lent undue credibility, it can instead be done more quietly by a party that's a little less official.

A negotiating party doesn't necessarily need to sit down with an alleged terrorist group as a first step, either. In Northern Ireland, "megaphone diplomacy", the practice of disseminating messages through the mass media where direct contact is impossible or undesirable, was employed by the British and Irish government to address Irish Republicans and reveal the terms by which they could be admitted into peace talks.

This also demonstrates how "dialogue" can be distinguished somewhat from "negotiation". L. Paul Bremer, a former United States government official, explained that although the United States may never negotiate with terrorists, they are always willing to "talk" about the welfare of hostages.

And if you're really concerned about negotiating with a organisation deemed to be terrorist in nature, then you can widen the scope of your dialogue to address a terrorist conflict without engaging the terrorists themselves. For example, the Iraq War was often described as one to "win hearts and minds". Whether or not that's accurate, opening dialogue with disaffected civilian populations can reduce popular support for terrorist groups by ensuring the claims terrorists make about their purported enemies are not proven true; that they aren't evil and aren't out to conquer the world... presumably. Threats to and exclusions or alienations of people are what sustain terror as a tactic. If states can identify the root causes driving terrorist groups, and those that which draw them support from wider populations, then they can direct communications at these populations to address or acknowledge these issues.

In many situations, there even exist parallel political organisations which share the political aims of terrorist groups, but don't engage in terrorist acts themselves - for example, Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. It's generally more palatable to deal with groups who haven't been out killing people, and it also helps avoid the perception that terrorists are having their tactics endorsed in some way.

Not that negotiation equates with capitulation. In opening lines of communication with a terrorist group, a government or other organisation doesn't commit itself to any kinds of concession, it only grants the opportunity for terrorists to resolve some of their underlying issues peacefully. This distinction is extremely fine, though, and tends to be one that will lose a government all kinds of political capital rapidly.

Rewarding Terror

If a child starts yelling and breaking things because they want a toy, or screaming in the supermarket because their mum didn't buy them a Bubble 'o Bill, then it's not much of a stretch to see that if their parents give in and give them that toy or ice cream, the child will probably figure out that by behaving badly they'll get what they want. Sure, in the short term the parent gets a bit of peace and quiet, but it means they've had to buy something they otherwise would not have, and the child will be more likely to try the crying approach again in the future.

You might say the situation is similar with terrorists, only it tends to involve a little more destruction and death. For example, if someone has taken hostages and the negotiators give into their demands, it's not a bad incentive to try taking hostages again.

But this presumes a situation of negotiation as surrender. You can instead open dialogue to convince terrorists that they will not receive their demands, and to find a better outcome. Many terrorists are still willing to die, of course; and a terrorist who fails to achieve his demands but executes himself along with his hostages after a period of non-negotiation may be a martyr. But if they're not willing to go that far, a terrorist who fails and, through dialogue, is convinced to release his hostages, will be an embarrassment, discouraging future terrorist action.

Resolving long-fought conflicts can hardly be regarded as an invitation to other groups to engage in similar behaviour, either. Negotiation in Northern Ireland came after decades of armed conflict by Irish Republicans, at a point where they were weary of continuing with it. Few groups would see that as a worthwhile strategy to emulate.

Trusting a Terrorist

It's difficult to hold a negotiation or reach an agreement if you can't be sure the other side will hold up its end of any bargain. Usually this can come down to a question of trust, but even if you're willing to talk with a terrorist, trust can be a much bigger ask. Further complicating this is the fact that terrorists aren't constrained by international laws as states are, nor do they have much in the way of international accountability. The option of defecting from any agreements made would certainly be tempting, and if you've shown you'll resort to nefarious tactics, then it's not much of a stretch to see that you might not be entirely honest and reliable.

This is particularly true in the case of a simple hostage-taker seeking to achieve a short-term goal, such as the release of a prisoner; once the goal is achieved, reneging isn't a big deal. But groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah purport to represent constituencies in pursuit of long-term goals. It might be difficult to achieve an agreement with them, but once this happens, they'll be less likely to defect as it might threaten future concessions and agreements.

Impossible demands

There will always be some groups that hold unacceptably extreme positions from which they allow no room to compromise or equivocate. But generalisations must not be made to include all so-called terror groups in this assessment. Even in organisations where some will only take hardline positions, not all their members will share this stubbornness; for example, financiers may not feel they have nothing to lose as a prospective self-proclaimed "martyr" might. And opening lines of dialogue can also help uncover room for compromise that was not so obvious before.

Then there are situations where there are demands and claims that just can't be realised. But negotiation doesn't require demands to be realised completely in order to be successful. Some terrorist groups do indeed have long-term objectives which can be realised in part, or incorporated into a compromise. Some academics have pointed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a situation where compromise could help ensure peace; the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state in return for a commitment to acknowledge Israel's right to exist. History suggests this might still be somewhat unrealistic, but it demonstrates there is room to negotiate even with groups whose aspirations would at first seem impossible to satisfy. Indeed, negotiations can be aimed at re-establishing some sense of reality in a terrorist group, at isolating factions with immovably unrealistic demands, and at seeking goals that may be realised in part.

Overcoming barrier of public opinion

Governments must face the reality that their survival depends on public opinion. Democratic principles require that they adhere to the people's wishes as much as is practicable. Following sustained or large-scale attacks against civilian populations, many in the public would be unwilling to entertain the idea of anything short of a strong military reprisal. War, and a drive for revenge, serves as a necessary form of catharsis, and any suggestion of compromise or concession can be perceived as a reward to those who hurt them so deeply. The dead are seen to be dishonoured; the government appears weak, and therefore the public feels they are in a position of greater vulnerability. This says nothing about the potential efficacy of negotiation should it go ahead, but it does suggest governments may lack the will to pursue such a course of action.

So it's important to look to the advantages of negotiation. It provides an alternative to military action, thereby preventing further bloodshed. Terrorist claims of moral authority are weakened when a state doesn't resort to violence, even if that violence would have been of a different quality to that which prompted it. Furthermore, it helps avoid further radicalisation in the communities from which terrorists come and any desire for revenge on the part of groups that once were innocent and unaffected. By avoiding violence, you avoid the opportunity for terrorists to set the agenda. The vicious cycle of terror is broken.

Merely offering negotiation or dialogue can reduce the popular support from which terrorists draw new recruits and ideological justification. While you might not be successful in influencing the terrorists themselves, it can reduce their public support and the credibility of their justifications for using violence. Negotiations in Northern Ireland did not always bring a conclusive end to violence, but they did shift public support and focus to a peaceful resolution, and reduced support for terrorist actions.

Perhaps most significantly of all, negotiation and dialogue can open the way to resolving the underlying issues that prompt people to resort to terrorism; identifying, acknowledging, and perhaps even addressing the social, economic, religious, and political factors which can give birth to some terrorist movements. It might not deter the most extreme of terrorists, particularly those with agendas with little basis in reality, but it can influence those moderate sectors of the population who might have otherwise joined their cause.

The better angels of our nature

In his first inaugural address, United States President Abraham Lincoln extended an overture to his adversaries in the southern states. He reminded them of the bonds that united them, rather than that which divided them, speaking of a time in which peace could be found through the guidance of the "better angels of our nature". Such thinking may be appropriate today. While Lincoln spoke of his fellow countrypersons, we should recognise our shared common humanity and place in this world. Negotiating with terrorists may be an unpalatable proposition, but it is not one that is always without merit if it helps find solutions which limit bloodshed, break cycles of violence, reduce support for existing terrorist groups, and help identify and address the factors that give rise to such movements, allowing the prevention of future terrorist conflicts.